Romans 7:21 - Joseph Benson’s Commentary on the Old and New Testaments

I find then a law An inward constraining power, flowing from my depraved nature; that when I would When I incline and purpose to do good, evil is present with me To prevent the execution of such a purpose. The expression, when I would do good, intimates that this inclination to do good was not permanent; it only arose on particular occasions. This is another feature of an unregenerate man; his inclinations and purposes to do good, and live to the glory of God, are only temporary. “They,” says Macknight, “who think the apostle is here describing his own case, and the case of other regenerated persons, should consider that he does not speak of single instances of omission of duty, and commission of sin; for the words which he uses all denote a continuation or habit of acting. Now how such a habit of doing evil and neglecting good can be attributed to any regenerated person, and especially to the Apostle Paul, who, before this Epistle to the Romans was written, told the Thessalonians, Ye are witnesses, and God also, how holily, and righteously, and unblameably we behaved among you, I confess I do not comprehend. See also 2Co 1:12; 2 Corinthians 7:1-2; 2 Corinthians 10:2-3. To elude the force of this argument, Augustine affirms that the apostle does not speak of his outward actions, but of the inward motions of his concupiscence, by which he means, evil desire in general: and that for the reason mentioned in the note on Romans 7:17, he expresses these motions by the pronoun I. Be it so. On this supposition, Rom 7:15 will mean, ‘What I, my concupiscence, thoroughly worketh, in my mind, I do not approve. For I, my concupiscence, practiseth not, in my mind, that to which I incline; but what I hate, that I, my concupiscence, doth.' Now, not to insist on the impropriety of applying words which denote outward actions, to motions of evil desire in the mind, I ask, what sense is there in the apostle's telling us, that his concupiscence did not practise in his mind what he inclined to? For if what he inclined to was good, it could not possibly be practised by concupiscence, if concupiscence be evil desire; consequently, it was foolishness in him either to expect it from concupiscence, or to complain of the want of it, as he does Romans 7:19. He might complain of the existence of concupiscence in his mind; but if it were suffered to remain there uncontrolled, and if it hindered the actings of his sanctified will so effectually that he never did that to which he inclined, but always did the evil to which his sanctified will did not incline, is not this the clearest proof that concupiscence, or evil desire, was the prevailing principle in his mind, and that his sanctified will had no power to restrain its workings? Now could the apostle give any plainer description of an unregenerate person than this?”