Saving for the cause of fornication. — The most generic term seems intentionally used to include ante-nuptial as well as post-nuptial sin, possibly, indeed, with reference to the former only, seeing that the strict letter of the Law of Moses made death the punishment of the latter, and so excluded the possibility of the adultery of a second marriage. The words causeth her to commit adultery imply that the “putting away” was legally a divorce à vinculo, leaving the wife, and à fortiori the husband, at liberty to marry again; for otherwise she could not have incurred the guilt of adultery by a second marriage: but it asserts that in such a case, when divorce was obtained on any other ground than the specific sin which violated the essence of the marriage contract, man’s law (even that of Moses) was at variance with the true eternal law of God.
Whosoever shall marry her that is divorced. — The Greek is less definite, and may be rendered either “a woman who has been put away,” or better, “her when she has been put away.” Those who take the former construction, infer from it the absolute unlawfulness of marriage with a divorced woman under any circumstances whatever; some holding that the husband is under the same restrictions, i.e., that the vinculum matrimonii is absolutely indissoluble; while others teach that in the excepted case, both the husband and the wife gain the right to contract a second marriage. The Romish Church, in theory, takes the former view, the Greek and most Reformed Churches the latter; while some codes, like those of some countries in modern Europe, go back to the looser interpretation of Deuteronomy 24:1, and allow the divorce à vinculo for many lesser causes than incontinence. Of these contending views, that which is intermediate between the two extremes seems to be most in harmony with the true meaning of our Lord’s words. The words “put away” would necessarily convey to His Jewish hearers the idea of an entire dissolution of the marriage union, leaving both parties free to contract a fresh marriage; and if it were not so, then the case in which He specially permits that dissolution would stand on the same level as the others. The injured husband would still be bound to the wife who had broken the vow which was of the essence of the marriage-contract. But if he was free to marry again, then the guilt of adultery could not possibly attach to her subsequent marriage with another. The context, therefore, requires us to restrict that guilt to the case of a wife divorced for other reasons, such as Jewish casuistry looked on as adequate. This, then, seems the true law of divorce for the Church of Christ as such to recognise. The question as to how far national legislation may permit divorce for other causes, such as cruelty or desertion, seems to stand on a different footing, and must be discussed on different grounds. In proportion as the “hardness of heart” which made the wider license the least of two evils prevails now, it may be not only expedient, but right and necessary, though it implies a standard of morals lower than the law of Christ, to meet it, as it was met of old, by a like reluctant permission.