CRITICAL NOTES.—
Proverbs 17:26. Also, rather, even. It emphasizes the verb immediately following, viz., to punish, i.e., to inflict a pecuniary fine. Zockler renders the verse. “Also to punish the righteous is not good, to smile the noble contrary to justice,” and explains the meaning thus, “The fine as a comparatively light penalty which may easily at one time or another fall with a certain justice even on a just man, stands contrasted with the much severer punishment with stripes; and as these two verbal ideas are related, so are also the predicates ‘not good’ and ‘contrary to right’ (above desert, beyond all proportion to the just and reasonable) in the relation of a climax.” Delitzsch reads, “Also to inflict punishment on the righteous is not good; this, that one overthrows the noble on account of his righteousness,” i.e., it is not good when a ruler makes his power to punish to be felt by the innocent as well as by the guilty. Miller translates, “Even deserved punishment to the righteous does not seem good, when designed to chasten the willing with a view to holiness,” and explains his translation of the word generally translated princes, or the noble, by a reference to the Hebrew root from which it is derived and which may be rendered willing or generous.
MAIN HOMILETICS OF Proverbs 17:26
SMITING THE JUST
This verse has been variously rendered and explained. (See Critical Notes and the comments of different expositors). It suggests, however—
I. That punishment in itself is sometimes necessary and desirable. When the laws of the family are wise and good, it is a great misfortune for the children, and a great sin against them, not to visit their transgressions with a suitable punishment. And it is absolutely essential to the existence of a well-ordered state, that there should be punishment for those who rebel against righteous laws. Civil rule is of Divine ordination—“the powers that be are ordained of God” (Romans 13:1). When, therefore, there is no just cause for civil rebellion, it is a sin not only against the state but against the Ruler of all the kingdoms of the earth, to break the established laws. Punishment forms a necessary part of the government of the universe. God has, both by example and precept, shown its necessity. When there was rebellion in heaven against a perfect government, punishment followed, which was proportioned to the greatness of the transgression—the sentence passed upon the first rebel in the universe and upon those who were confederate with him was a terrible one, but it was only commensurate to the exceeding magnitude of the offence. If rebellion against such a government had been allowed to go unpunished, it would have made way for universal anarchy. And a community of any kind without punishment for transgressors, is lacking in a most essential element of its peace and stability.
II. But those whose moral character fits them to be the awarders of punishment are often the victims of it. The natural and right order of things in this respect is often exactly the reverse of what it ought to be, and just and noble men are treated as transgressors and suffer the punishment which ought to fall upon their persecutors. Might is very far from being right in this world, and even in this country Richard Baxter stood at the bar while Judge Jeffries sat upon the bench. The apostles of the Lord suffered scourging at the hands of the council at Jerusalem (Acts 5:40); Paul was condemned to death by Nero, and Incarnate Righteousness was crucified between two thieves at the instigation of some of the worst men that the world has ever seen. In all these cases, and in ten thousand others, the just were smitten, and as a rule they have suffered, not merely although they were righteous, but because they were so—it was their integrity that aroused the enmity of their persecutors—these moral “princes” were “stricken for equity.”
III. Such an abuse of power will in its turn be visited with punishment. Those who have thus unjustly condemned the righteous, have found in their own personal experience that “to punish the just is not good”—“not good” for their own peace of mind—not good for their future reputation—not good for the nation who instigated them or permitted them to do the deed. Haman found that it was not good for him to aim a blow at the upright Mordecai when he was himself hanged upon his own gallows; the Persian princes found it was not good to strike a prince for equity when they were themselves cast into the den of lions; Judge Jeffries found it out when he lay face to face with death in the Tower. And among all the nations whose history has confirmed the truth of the text, none stands out so prominently as that one whose king was the author of the proverb. The punishment of the just—the striking of moral princes for equity—was one of the most prominent of their national crimes, and He whose death at their hands filled up the measure of their iniquity, declared that it was the great cause of their national ruin. “Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say if we had been in the days of our fathers we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves that ye are the children of them that killed the prophets … Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and Scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them ye shall scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar” (Matthew 23:29-35). The Jewish nation has been for nearly nineteen centuries a witness that “to punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity.”
OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS
Even deserved punishment to the righteous does not seem good when designed to chasten the willing with a view to holiness. “Even.” This seems to have been treated as a word de trop. King James’ men make it also; as though Solomon grew tired of sameness, and broke the monotone by a new opening vocable. But with the above rendering it takes its usual sense. “Righteous.” This word and “punishment” bear the weight of the word “even.” Even the righteous, who ought to know better; and “even punishment,” which the righteous, at least, ought to be willing to bear.—Miller.
Often is the wise man’s meaning much beyond his words. To punish the just not only is not good, but it is “the abomination” (Proverbs 17:15)—“an evident token of perdition” (Philip. Proverbs 1:28). If rulers are “a terror to good works,” they are ministers of God in authority, but ministers of Satan in administration. And how will such injustice “abide the day of His coming,” when He shall “lay judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet!”—Bridges.
The word prince signifies noble, and is differently understood. It may be applied to the nobility of station, or to that of mind. Some give preference to the latter; and by interpreting it of the noble-minded, and the “just” in the former clause, of the righteous or the people of God, make the two clauses thus to correspond, and to have much the same import. It seems, however, both more natural and more comprehensive to consider two ideas as expressed; the one relating to the duty of the ruler, and the other to that of the ruled. It is the incumbent duty of the ruler, on the one part, to administer justice with strict impartiality. It is the duty, on the other part, of subjects to countenance, encourage, and support the ruler in the equitable administration of his trust. To “strike” is evidently to be understood, not literally alone of actual striking, but of “smiting with the tongue” as well as with the fist or the rod,—of all kinds of vituperation and abuse, and attempts to bring the throne into disrepute and odium, and unsettle its stability, by shaking the confidence and attachment of the community. There are many occasions in which a man may be tempted to this. He may, in particular cases, have his mind biassed by pride, by self-interest, by partiality towards a friend, by political predilections; so that even when all has been done with impartial investigation, and the judgment pronounced according to the legitimate rules of evidence and demands of equity, there may be unfair, unreasonable and angry dissatisfaction; and the prince may be smitten for justice. Every man ought to be on his guard against this. The higher the responsibility,—the more burdensome and difficult the trust,—and the more serious the results of bringing authorities and the laws into disesteem, and unsettling public confidence in them,—ought to be the amount of our reluctant caution in pronouncing censure. Another remark may be ventured. One of the great difficulties with which governments of great nations have to contend, arises from the variety of crossing and contending interests with which they have to deal. How anxious soever they may honestly be, to allow no undue bias to draw them from the line of impartial justice, yet there is hardly a measure they can adopt that does not affect differently different classes of the community; so that, from their various predisposing circumstances, that shall appear to one class—to those in one particular department of trade or commerce—the very essence of injustice, which by another is lauded as a most unexceptionable exemplification of impartial equity. This ought surely to have the effect—I do not by any means say of forbidding the most vigilant observance and the freest and most searching scrutiny and discussion of every measure, and the exposure of its evil or questionable character and tendency—but assuredly of procuring some allowance for the difficulty of the task of pleasing all parties, and some moderation in the tone of censure even where to us the grounds for it are clear and palpable. No man who knows himself will affirm, in almost any case, that, placed, in other circumstances, he might not see with other eyes. I speak in general. There are cases in which the interests of a suffering country are, to a vast extent, involved, in which it becomes every man’s paramount duty to speak out and to speak plainly, and to make the ears of the rulers to tingle with the outcry of humanity and justice. I would further apply the spirit of this verse to the case of arbitrators. We have ourselves, it may be, consented to submit a litigated point to arbitration. We do so with a full persuasion of our being in the right—of our claim being the just one. But the arbiters unite in giving it against us. It would be most unreasonable on our part to retain a grudge, especially at the one appointed by ourselves, on this account. Our reference implied confidence in his impartiality and honour, and implied a pledge of cheerful acquiescence. To grumble, to censure, and to withdraw our friendship, would be indeed to “strike him for equity.” He would have proved himself unworthy of his trust, if his disposition to please and serve us had been too strong for principle, conscience, and oath. There is one government, in which “the just” are never “punished”—all whose laws and all whose sanctions are the perfection of equity. But alas! it is under that very government that the spirit expressed by the phrase “striking princes for equity” is most fearfully manifested. All the murmurings of sinners against either the law of God or its revealed and threatened penalty, are the very essence, in its deepest malignity, of this spirit.—Wardlaw.
Righteous men are princes in all lands (Psalms 45:16); yea, they are kings in righteousness as Melchisedec. Indeed they are somewhat obscure kings as he was, but kings they appear to be, by comparing Matthew 13:17 with Luke 10:24; “many righteous,” saith Matthew, “many kings,” saith Luke. Now, to strike a king is high treason; and although princes have put up blows, as when one struck our Henry VI., he only said, “Forsooth, you do wrong yourself more than me, to strike the Lord’s anointed.”—Trapp.